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We develop a model of cities each inhabited by two agents, one specializing in 
manufacturing, the other in retail distribution. The distribution sector represents the physical 
transformation of all internationally traded goods from the factory gate to the  final 
consumer. Using a panel of micro-prices at the city level, we decompose the cross-sectional 
variance of long-run LOP deviations into the fraction due to distribution costs, trade costs 
and a residual. For the median good, trade costs account for 50 percent of the variance, 
distribution costs account for 10 percent with 40 percent of the variance unexplained. Since 
the sample of items in the data are heavily skewed toward traded goods, we also decompose 
the variance based on the median good on an expenditure-weighted basis. Now the tables 
turn, with distribution costs accounting for 43 percent, trade costs 36 percent and 21 percent 
of the variance unexplained. 
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We build a model of international cities with each city inhabited by two representative
agents, a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer produces a single homogeneous
good using labor as the only input. The manufactured good is transported to all other cities
with deviations in the prices of these traded goods across cities arising from transportation
costs from the factory gate to the receiving dock at the retail establishment. The retailer
allocates some fraction of her time and a local ￿xed factor to the provision of ￿nal goods (as
well as pure services) in her city of residence. The value added by the retailer constitutes the
distribution costs in our model. The economic role of the retailer is broader than suggested
by the label: a good-speci￿c distribution share parameter allows us to capture a spectrum
of ￿nal consumption goods ranging from pure local services to internet purchases.
The equilibrium of the model pins down the manufacturing wage premium within each
city and relative wages across cities. The manufacturing wage premium (relative to retail-
ing) is declining in the consumption-expenditure-weighted distribution share. The relative
wage across cities, in both sectors, is pinned down by the specialization assumption. The
highest wage city is the city that produces the good with the highest product of two key
parameters: the consumption expenditure share and traded input share (which is one minus
the distribution share).
Local wages, land prices and trade costs enter a cost function, speci￿c to the city and
good, which determines the retail market price. These cost functions form the basis for LOP
variance decompositions (variance of prices across cities) into distribution margins, trade cost
margins and residuals, good-by-good. The distribution margins are further parsed into the
in￿ uences of service sector wages and retail infrastructure costs across cities. The Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) retail price data along with supplementary sources for wages and
rental prices at the city level are used in the empirical work. Since the model assumes
perfect competition and abstracts from o¢ cial barriers to trade, the residual in the regression
equation is expected to include markups, o¢ cial barriers to trade and measurement error.
We have two sets of results, one for the sources of LOP deviations for the median good,
the other for the di⁄erences in the sources of LOP deviations across goods in the cross-section. For the median good in the EIU sample, trade costs account for about 50 percent
of LOP deviations, the distribution margin accounts for about 10 percent and the remaining
40 percent is unaccounted for. Because the median good in the EIU has a distribution share
of only 0.2, well below the aggregate distribution share of about 0.5 in the U.S. National
Income and Product Accounts, we also report variance decomposition results centered on
this parameter value. Now the tables turn, with distribution costs accounting for 43 percent,
trade costs 36 percent and 21 percent of the variance (in LOP deviations) left unexplained.
The absolute level of cross-sectional retail price variance rises when a border is crossed as
one would expect or when comparisons are made between cities with vastly di⁄erent wealth
levels. However, the relative importance of trade costs and distribution costs in accounting
for this variance is fairly stable across sets of locations that include high and low income
countries and when comparing within country and cross-border city pairs. One exception is
the division of the variance accounted for by the distribution sector into the cost of labor
and capital. Variance of the distribution costs across low income countries is dominated by
di⁄erences in the rental component, with wages playing a smaller role. For other countries,
the division of the distribution costs into the contribution of wages and rental prices is closer
to equality.
Turning to di⁄erences in geographic price dispersion across goods, we ￿nd substantial
heterogeneity. In the international data, the distribution margin accounts for 50 percent
of cross-sectional variance in LOP deviations for the good with the highest distribution
share and this fraction falls to a mere 10 percent as we move to the good with the lowest
distribution share. Retail infrastructure accounts for more than 30 percent of the cross-
sectional variance in LOP deviations across Canada and the United States for the good with
the highest infrastructure intensity, while accounting for virtually none of the variance for
the good with the lowest infrastructure intensity.
Our theoretical model is closest to Giri (2009) who adds a good-speci￿c distribution
cost to the Eaton-Kortum (2002) model. In Giri￿ s model distribution services are in ￿xed
proportion to the physical units of the base good as in Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003)
(BNR) with e¢ ciencies drawn from a distribution with a country-speci￿c mean and common
world-wide variance. In contrast, we assume that the technological parameter for distribution
2inputs is good￿ speci￿c while the productivity of the distribution sector is city-speci￿c. Given
that this margin is measurable in the NIPA, we view this as a more tractable way to model
the distribution sector than the random e¢ ciency approach. Our model shares with Alvarez
and Lucas (2007), Atkeson and Burstein (2007), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Naknoi
(2008) an interest in the role of traditional trade costs. However, to the extent these papers
incorporate a distribution sector, it is a common wedge across all goods in the retail basket,
which assumes away any cross-sectional variance in price deviations due to the distribution
margin. We ￿nd this heterogeneity to be essential for improving our understanding of LOP
deviations.
Our empirical work builds upon Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005; henceforth CTZ)
who study microeconomic price dispersion in retail markets across European capital cities
using a series of rich cross-sections of Eurostat data at ￿ve year intervals from 1975 to 1990.
They regress good-by-good price dispersion on an estimate of the share of non-traded inputs
into retail production and a trade share, both of which they view as proxies for trade costs,
broadly de￿ned. They ￿nd price dispersion to be rising in the non-traded input share and
declining in the trade share. The signs of their coe¢ cients are consistent with our model and
our empirical ￿ndings. The key advantages of our approach include: a substantially larger
sample of locations; the use of a structural economic model; and the use of direct measures
of local wages and land prices to measure the role of the distribution sector.
Also related are recent studies that focus on the variance of the prices of traded goods
from a single source to destinations strati￿ed by relative wages or income. Alessandria (2004)
and Alessandria and Kaboski (2007) argue that high wage countries are charged a higher
markup at the dock because search costs are born at the destination and are positively
related to wages. Choi, Hummels and Qiang (2009) argue that it is infeasible to measure the
prices of identical goods and attribute the positive correlation between markups and income
to the fact that higher income individuals are willing to pay a premium for quality. These
are plausible and interesting sources of variation in markups, which, due to data constraints,
we are forced to relegate to our residual term.
32. The Model
Each city, indexed by j, is inhabited by two representative agents. As is usual in representa-
tive agent frameworks, these two agents should be viewed as stand-ins for a large number of
atomistic agents of each type, since we will be assuming perfect competition in all factor and
￿nal goods markets throughout. In each city, one agent specializes in the production of a
single traded good, indexed by i, while the other specializes in retail trade and production of
non-traded services. Production in the manufacturing sector is proportional to labor input,
the factor of proportionality is a random productivity variable. Retail production requires
both labor and capital. Capital is ￿xed and is broadly de￿ned to include land, buildings,
equipment and public infrastructure. Productivity varies across cities in both the traded
goods sector and the retail sector.
Traded goods are subject to iceberg transportation costs which are good and destination
speci￿c. Final goods and local inputs (retailer labor and retail capital) are not traded beyond
the city limits. While hours and consumption are both choice variables, the assumptions we
make in the model imply constant hours in all sectors in all locations, reminiscent of the
Long and Plosser (1983) multi-sector, closed economy, real business cycle model. Retail
infrastructure, including land, capital and equipment, is in ￿xed supply (denoted Kj).
The good index, i, distinguishes physical objects from the identities of agents and loca-
tions only when needed to avoid confusion. In describing the ￿ ow of goods from one location
to another, the source is the ￿rst subscript and the destination is the second subscript. Thus,
Xsd refers to the shipment of good X, from city s to city d. Given the assumption that in-
dividuals at each location specialize, s also indexes the good and the individual to whom
the income ￿ ows, while d indicates the expenditure side of the equation. ￿sd is the iceberg
shipping cost from the source to the destination. Since there are no durable goods or assets
in the model, adding time subscripts is innocuous: they are omitted here since the focus is
on the steady-state properties of the model and long-run deviations from the LOP.
The full solution for quantities and prices is given in the appendix. This section presents
the complete model and parts of the equilibrium solution relevant for pricing implications,
which is the focus of our empirical work.
42.1. Consumers













j , A = m;s. (2.1)
CA
j is aggregate consumption and LA
j is hours of leisure, for an individual working in city
j. There are two individuals in each city, indexed by A = m;s; one is engaged in the
manufacture of a single good (m) and the other is engaged in retailing and service activities
(s).




















ij is the consumption of good i in city j by worker of type A; " > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution across goods, ￿i is a good speci￿c taste parameter and M is the number of
manufactured goods in existence. M is also the number of cities given our specialization
assumption.












where Pij is the price of good i in destination city j. These prices will be the same for all
agents in the same location, but di⁄er across locations for reasons described below. Each of
the two residents of city j earn labor income from their production activities and split the
rental income accruing to the retail infrastructure in their city (’m + ’s = 1), the stock of
which is assumed to be ￿xed at Kj. The rental price of retail infrastructure is denoted Hj.
The consumer￿ s problem may be solved in two stages. In the ￿rst stage, the consumer
chooses aggregate consumption and leisure, subject to a budget and time allocation con-
straint. In the second stage, the consumer minimizes expenditure across goods. Here we
collapse the problem to a single stage for brevity. The key equations from the solution to









































i PijCij = PjCj as well as a theoretical mapping from
price indices to welfare.
The ￿rst equation determines consumption demand for a particular good as a function
of the relative price of the good paid by the ￿nal consumer in their home market and that
individual￿ s aggregate consumption level. It is important to note that, Pij is the retail price
of good i, in city j; it embodies the cost of local retail services paid to the retailer in addition
to the traditional iceberg trade costs of the imported item. The price index, is a weighted
average of these retail prices, the closest empirical counterpart would be the CPI index. The
second equation is aggregate consumption of an agent, which is equal to her real income.
Real income is the sum of nominal wage and rental income, de￿ ated by the local price level,
Pj.
The last two equations determine hours of work and leisure. In the absence of rental
income, the two agents would work the same number of hours, independent of their relative
wage, due to the o⁄setting income and substitution e⁄ect of wages on e⁄ort with Cobb-
Douglas preferences. In the presence of rental income the requirement for constant e⁄ort
in equilibrium is that the ratio of rental income to labor income be constant. Most growth
models impose restrictions on tastes and technology to ensure constancy of hours per capita
in the presence of trending productivity.1
1Details of these restrictions in the context of the one sector stochastic growth model may be found in
King, Plosser and Rebelo (1988).
62.2. Manufacturers




where Ai is the productivity level and Nm
i is hours of work.








i ) . subject to Equation 2.8 (2.9)
The manufacturer receives the factor gate price, Qii, for every unit produced, no matter where
the goods end up being sold. Given the assumptions of constant returns to scale, perfect
competition and one factor of production, the factory gate price equals the manufacturing






Given specialization, the productivity level in this expression is good and city-speci￿c. The
presence of a nation-speci￿c component could easily be incorporated by allowing Ai to have
a common factor across cities located within the same country.
Retailers in each city purchase the manufactured goods and pay a proportional shipping
cost. Thus the retail purchase price is the factory-gate price marked up by a proportional
shipping cost:
Qij = (1 + ￿ij)Qii = (1 + ￿ij)W
m
i =Ai (2.11)
where ￿ij > 0 is the net transportation cost from city i to j. Qij is the price the retailer pays
in the destination city. The empirical counterpart to this would be a wholesale price. The
local manufacturing plant is close enough to the city to ignore local transportation costs so
that ￿ii = 0. E⁄ectively this cuts out one intermediary, the wholesaler, and the retailer is
viewed as operating next to the factor gate. The destination price of the manufactured good
depends: i) positively on both the manufacturing wage and the trade cost; and ii) negatively
on manufacturing productivity.
72.3. Retailers
The retailer in each city optimally chooses how much of each manufactured good to purchase
from various cities of the world. The retailer transforms these goods using a fraction of her
time endowment and some amount of the local retail infrastructure. The retailer then sells
the resulting composite good in the local retail market. The production function for good i,









Gij is the amount of the manufactured good imported from city i, by a retailer in city
j. Ns
ij is the fraction of the retailer￿ s time endowment allocated to the transformation of
imported good i for local consumption in city j and Kij is the amount of retail infrastructure
allocated to retail good i in city j. Bj is labor-augmenting productivity speci￿c to the city
(equivalently, the retailer), common to all goods sold there.2
While the production function is restricted to be common to all locations, it is very
￿ exible across goods. It captures pure labor services (e.g., baby-sitting services) with ￿i
equal to zero and ￿i equal to one; internet purchases (e.g., Amazon.com book purchases), ￿i
equal to one, and all points in between.
The retailer in city, j, minimizes costs of the sale of each good, i, by optimally choosing
the three inputs needed to produce the good: i) the amount of the traded input, Gij, to
import ii) the fraction of her time to devote to the good, Ns
ij; and iii) how much local








ij + HjKij + QijGij) subject to Equation 2.12 (2.13)
At the optimum, the unit price equals marginal cost. Given constant returns to scale and
three factors of production, the retail price of good i sold in location j, is a Cobb-Douglas
aggregate of the price (inclusive of trade cost) that the retailer paid to acquire the traded
2In principle one could add good-speci￿c productivity of retailers to account for di⁄erent levels of com-
petency across goods, but we lack productivity data to operationalize this idea.
8input, Qij, the retailer￿ s market wage, W s
























The retail price in city j is rising in input prices and falling in retail productivity, Bj.
2.4. Equilibrium
The appendix contains the tedious algebra necessary to arrive at the equilibrium allocations
discussed in this section. In the remainder of the paper the consumption aggregator is
restricted to Cobb-Douglas to arrive at closed form solutions.
In the global general equilibrium, all the optimality conditions of partial equilibrium must
hold for consumers, retailers and manufacturers. In addition, the supply of each good must












= Gi + Ti (2.18)
In words: the production of good i, Yi, is exhausted between the global demand for that
good by retailers aggregated across destinations, Gi, and physical loses due to iceberg costs,
Ti.
Each individual has a ￿xed amount of time to devote to hours of work and leisure, here,













ij = 1 . (2.20)
The summation in the second time constraint re￿ ects the fact that the retailer must divide
her time across all the di⁄erent retailing activities. The notation implicitly sets the number
of goods at the retail level equal to the number of goods in the manufacturing sector. Nothing
we derive requires this: we could have some activities that use no traded inputs at all in
9which case the number of retail goods would exceed the number of manufacturing goods by
the number of pure services produced by ￿ retailers￿in each city.






Our focus is retail price dispersion across international cities at the microeconomic and
macroeconomic level. The data source for prices is the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
worldwide retail price survey. The survey spans 123 cities, located in 79 countries. Most of
the cities are national capitals. The larger number of cities than countries is due to the fact
that the survey also includes multiple cities in a few countries. Noteworthy are the 16 U.S.
cities included in the survey; the next largest number of cities surveyed equals 5 in Australia,
China and Germany. Up to data availability for particular years and cities, the number of
goods and services priced is 301. The available sample is 1990 to 2005.
3.1. Retail prices
Our goal is to understand the sources of variation in LOP deviations. The Cobb-Douglas
functional forms in our model rationalize the use of logarithms of LOP deviations across
bilateral city-pairs:
qijk;t = ln(Sjk;tPij;t=Pik;t) . (3.1)
where Sjk;t represents the nominal exchange rate across cities j and k at time t. Our long-run
focus further suggests the use of time-averaged deviations:
qijk = T
￿1 X
t qijk;t . (3.2)
Crucini and Telmer (2007) derive a variance decomposition which is very useful for splitting
the total variance of LOP deviations into long-run deviations and time series ￿ uctuations:
V arjk;t(qi;jk;t ji) = V arjk(Et[qi;jk;t ji;jk]) + Ejk[V art(qi;jk;t ji;jk)] (3.3)
Vi = Ti + Fi : (3.4)
10The ￿rst term, Ti, which is meant to remind the reader of trade costs broadly de￿ned, is
the focus of this paper. It is the variance of the deviations from the LOP across all location
pairs remaining after time-averages of the data have been taken. The role of time-averaging
is to eliminate the time series component of the variation, which is valid when the data
are stationary and su¢ ciently long time samples are available, which is the case here. The
second term, Fi, which is to remind the reader of ￿ uctuations, is the focus of the international
￿nance literature, often featuring short-run ￿ uctuations of LOP due to local currency price
stickiness. One of the novel ￿ndings of Crucini and Telmer is that the ratio of the variance
of the long-run deviations to the total (i.e., Ti=Vi) is very large for the average good: 0.51
for U.S.-Canada intranational pairs and 0.69 for all international city pairs in the EIU data.
In other words, the variance component this model focuses upon is at least as important in
an accounting sense as the focus of business cycle models.
One way to visualize this property of the data is to estimate LOP distributions using
kernel estimation. Figure 1 has eight such kernel estimates. Each chart contains two lines,
one for the distribution of time-averaged LOP, qijk, and one for the distribution of the time
series deviations from the long-run means, qijk;t￿qijk. The upper two charts are distributions
for U.S. city pairs and the lower two are international pairs. The left column uses non-traded
goods prices and the right column uses traded goods prices. The dominance of the long-run
sources of variation relative to the short-run (time series) sources of variation in most cases
is evident in the wider dispersion in the LOP distributions represented by the solid lines
than those represented by the dashed lines in each chart. The role of borders in increasing
price dispersion is evident in comparing the top and bottom panels and the role of the type
of good, as summarized by the classical dichotomy, is apparent by comparing charts in a
particular row across columns.
Table 1 presents summary statistics relating to these ￿gures. The least amount of price
dispersion is found in U.S. traded goods, 0.29 and the greatest amount is found in the case
of non-traded goods involving border crossings, 1.07. More surprising is the fact that non-
traded goods in the U.S. have less price dispersion than do traded goods internationally,
0.54 compared to 0.68. Interquartile di⁄erences yield similar measures of price dispersion.
As discovered by Crucini and Telmer (2007), the time series variation is always less than
11the long-run variance, with the possible exception of traded goods across U.S. cities and
even there one of the two measures (interquartile di⁄erence) also gives this ranking. Notice
also that the distinction between traded and non-traded goods is obvious in the long-run
measure, but ambiguous in the time series measure. Given our emphasis on trade costs,
broadly de￿ned and abstraction from stochastic variation due to shocks interacting with
sticky prices, this observation is another reason to focus on the time averaged data with our
model.
3.2. Wages and rental prices
The EIU survey o⁄ers little in the way of wage data. Supplemental wage data at the country
level come from the International Labor Organization (ILO) survey of occupational and
sectoral wages and at the city level from the Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) survey.
The ILO data are averages for countries. They span 49 sectors, 162 occupations and 137
countries. The sample period is annual from 1983 to 2003. The complete list of these sectors,
occupations, and countries is found in Oostendorp (2003). In the raw ILO data, the most
common period is the month, followed by the hour, but some countries report weekly pay,
others give daily rates for some occupations, and so on. In order to have a comparable wage
data across countries, the standardized version of ILO survey by Oostendorp (2003) is used:
in cases in which the wage data are reported as hourly or daily, then these wages were made
(roughly) comparable with monthly wages by multiplication by 160 and 20 respectively. In
order to have the largest panel of wage data that are comparable across countries, the monthly
wages in US dollars that have been obtained by country-speci￿c and uniform calibration in
Oostendorp (2003) are used.
Wage data at the city level is more appropriate given the EIU retail price data is city
based and the intent of the model. International cities were surveyed by the UBS in 2006.
These are hourly wages in US dollars, spanning occupations in 71 international cities, 60
of which are also surveyed by the EIU. Among the 60 EIU cities there are four cities from
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland; four cities from Germany, and
four cities from the U.S. The hourly wages have been obtained by dividing the income per
year in each occupation by the city level hours of work in a year, where the latter we collected
12by a survey, also conducted by the UBS.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) city wage data from the Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) Survey in 2006 are used to complement UBS data. These wage data are
hourly wages in US dollars for the same 16 US cities found in EIU retail price survey.
The combination of UBS and BLS wage data, then, provides wage data for 72 EIU cities,
comprised of 16 from the BLS and the remainder (non-U.S. cities) from the UBS. Within
these 72 EIU cities, in terms of intranational cities, we have two cities from Brazil, Canada,
China, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland; three cities from Germany, and 16 cities from
the US.3
In a preliminary part of the analysis, the BLS city wage data are used for broader wage
dispersion analysis. These data cover two industries, namely production and sales, for 400
cities (on average) within the U.S. in terms of hourly wages from 1999 to 2006.
A number of trade-o⁄s present themselves in terms of the model focus and the available
data. Country-level wage data is generally available for longer periods of time, but fewer
locations than city-level wage data. Since the model is explicitly constructed to mimic city
level aggregation and steady-state features, ideally one would want long time series at the
city level. Unfortunately these are simply not available. These trade-o⁄s are discussed as
they arise below.
Land prices and rents are even more di¢ cult to come by than are wages and prices. We
use the EIU survey data item: ￿Typical annual gross rent for top-quality units, 2,000 square
meters, suitable for warehousing or factory use.￿ 4
3.3. Distribution costs
The other two pieces of information are sectoral U.S. NIPA data and input-output tables,
used to compare our microeconomic regression estimates of the good-speci￿c distribution
3In an earlier version of this paper we used PWT per capita annual income data covering the annual
period from 1990 to 2004 to proxy for real wages. These data span all 79 EIU countries. The results were
qualitatively similar to those reported here.
4One additional commerical rental price is available in the EIU, ￿Typical annual gross rent for a 1,000
square meter unit in a Class A building in a prime location.￿Results are very similar with this alternative
measure.
13shares, 1 ￿ ￿i , with more direct, but quite aggregated, versions from these U.S. sources.
The NIPA data extend to 57 sectors, while the input-output data span 33 sectors. The
NIPA shares are computed as the value the producers receive relative to the value consumers
pay for the output of a particular sector. In practice, then, the distribution margin includes
transportation costs, retail and distribution costs and markups.
For the typical traded good, the distribution margin computed using the consumer value
less the producer value relative to the consumer value is about 50%. That is, the retail price
is about twice the producer price. However for services, the same NIPA data will produce
an estimate of the distribution margin close to zero. Consider a visit to the doctor￿ s o¢ ce
to receive an expensive vaccine injection by a nurse. Because of the arms length nature of
the transaction, it appears as though what the consumer pays, the producer gets. Most
existing studies record the distribution margin to be zero for all intents and purposes in
these situations.5 However, the economic concept that the distribution margin is intended
to capture in our model is the distinction between locally produced inputs and international
traded inputs. By this de￿nition, the distribution margin is actually close to 1, not 0, in
the example just described. The intent is to treat the labor services of the nurse at the
doctor￿ s o¢ ce consistently with the labor services of the salesperson at Walmart. Similarly,
the rent paid by the Walmart franchisee and the user￿ s cost of the hospital are also part of
the distribution margin and are also treated the same way.
Finally, the greater circle distance between cities in the EIU sample is used to estimate
the trade cost component of the LOP deviations at the retail level.6
5See, for example, Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003). Following a conversation between Crucini and
Rebelo, the distribution margin in Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005, 2007) makes an approximate
correction for this e⁄ect.
6Hummels (2001) provides the most comprehensive estimates of sectoral trade costs using import unit
values, a more direct method than employed here. Unfortunately these estimates are available for a limited
number of countries and are more aggregated than our retail data.
144. Microeconomic sources of long-run variation in wages
In the model, wage deviations arise across the retail and manufacturing sectors and across











i (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i￿i
(4.1)
Which is intuitive: the numerator is an expenditure share weighted average of labor￿ s share
of manufacturing and the denominator is the counterpart in retailing. The appearance of
the parameter ￿i in the denominator accounts for the fact that retail production involves
some retail infrastructure, unless ￿i = 1, in which case retail production is labor-only. Note,
also, that the ratio is the same in all cities.
As the primary interest is wage variation across cities as an explanation for cost and
price variation across cities, we would like to understand the wage ratio and e⁄ort ratios








(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Ns
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(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ Nm
j
Thus, given ￿xed shares of rental income across agents in the city, relative wages and relative
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￿1 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿1 + ’s￿(￿0 ￿ ￿1)
where ￿0 ￿
P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i and ￿1 ￿
P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i￿i. E⁄ort in both sectors is declining in
the share of rental income allocated to the agent (a wealth e⁄ect), and in the preference for
leisure (￿), as one would expect.









(1 ￿ ￿0) + ’A￿
￿1 + (1 ￿ ’A)￿
15￿ = ￿(￿0 ￿ ￿1).
As the retail sector becomes more labor intensive (thus reducing rental income), (￿0 ￿ ￿1)
converges to zero and the model reverts to the labor-only version with a common fraction of
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which is exactly the same expression as labor income shares in the more general case (see
equation (4.1)).


















The cross-city wage di⁄erential is the same in both sectors and is determined by the product
of the taste and technology parameters in the two locations being compared. The intuition
for this result is as follows. Consider, ￿rst, the special case in which all goods use traded
inputs in the same proportion, ￿j = ￿. Wages are higher in locations that produce the
goods most preferred by consumers, given by the comparison of ￿j and ￿k, a demand-side
e⁄ect. Next, consider the case with symmetric tastes across goods ￿j = ￿; then wages are
the highest for producers of manufactures requiring the least amount of input from retailers
(i.e., the lowest 1 ￿ ￿). Essentially, the higher the distribution share, the less productive is
an hour allocated to production of the manufactured good in terms of delivering a unit of
consumption to ￿nal consumers. This lowers the equilibrium real wage.
Wage data are available by occupation or sector of employment. Our model focuses on
the distinction between goods and services, suggesting the production sector de￿nition is
more appropriate. However, we use both labor classi￿cations as a robustness check.
The more comprehensive of the sources used is the ILO survey of wage levels across
countries. These data span 49 sectors, 162 occupations and 137 countries. The sample
period is annual from 1983 to 2003.7 Because the model is intended to be based on city-level
7Useful technical documentation is found in Remco H. Oostendorp (2003).
16data, the preferred measure is wage data from the UBS that span 14 occupations and 71
international cities for the year 2006.
According to the model, if the retail sector uses only labor and traded goods, the ratio
of manufacturing wages to service wages provides on estimate of the overall scale of the
distribution sector W m
j =W s
j = ￿=1￿￿, ￿ =
P
i ￿i￿i. Since we lack consumption expenditure
shares at the present time, we associate this with the distribution share alone since using the
symmetric taste version of the model we have: ￿ = ￿. A direct way to measure the overall
size of the distribution sector is to use U.S. NIPA data and input-output data. Crucini and
Shintani (2008) do exactly this and ￿nd ￿ = 0:57. The advantage of their calculation is that
is it based on expenditure weighting of sectoral ￿￿ s.
Table 2 reports the sectoral wage ratio averaged across locations as well as the implied
value for ￿. It turns out that the direct and indirect (model-based) estimates are equal when
U.S. wages in production sector relative to the sales sector are used. The wage ratio in the
international data is consistent with a value ￿ of 0.52. While this is a modest di⁄erence from
the U.S. value, the implied manufacturing wage premium is quite dramatically a⁄ected: it
is a factor of 5 smaller than the U.S. case. It could be that relative productivity di⁄erences
are the cause. Another possibility is that the U.S. and international agencies have di⁄erent
classi￿cation systems for the sectors.
As the theory is a two-sector model, any sectoral variation in wages in a particular city
is attributable to wage di⁄erences across the manufacturing and service sectors. Variation
in wages across sub-sectors are abstracted from entirely. Thus, it is important for the theory
that wages di⁄er signi￿cantly across locations and less so across sectors other than the two
sectors emphasized by the model (retail and manufacturing). And this is what is found.
Table 3 conducts a variance decomposition by sector and country for time-averaged wages
in the case of the ILO survey and an analogous decomposition by sector and city for wages
in 2006 for the UBS survey data. Since the answer may depend on the set of sectors and
locations used, we consider three location groups and allow for many sectors throughout.
The location groups are the entire world, the OECD and the LDC.
Based on the ILO wage data: locations account for between 72 and 85 percent of the
cross-sectional variation in wages, sectoral di⁄erences account for less than 10 percent. The
17dominance of location in accounting for wage dispersion is somewhat less pronounced when
the data is organized by occupation: location e⁄ects drop to between 38 and 65 percent.
Most of di⁄erence is not attributed to a pure sectoral component, but rather an interaction
of location and sector. The UBS tell a similar story to the ILO for location e⁄ects, with the
occupation e⁄ect rising in contribution due to a lower interaction with location compared to
the ILO.
In sum, location is a key component of wage dispersion with the precise fractions depend-
ing somewhat on the set of locations examined and the precise de￿nition of wage categories.
5. Microeconomic sources of long-run variation in real exchange
rates
We turn, now, to the main focus, price dispersion. In the model, prices consumers actually
pay may di⁄er from factory gate prices for two reasons. The ￿rst is the trade cost to import
the good from the foreign production location. The second is the value added by the retailer.
To simplify the notation, all international prices have been converted to common currency
units (it does not matter which numeraire is chosen). The ratio of the price of good i in city

















Noting that the last term reduces to the ratio of trade costs from the single source of good i
to each of the destinations, j and k and taking logs, de￿nes the Law-of-One-Price deviation
across a city pair:
qijk = (1 ￿ ￿i)[￿i!jk + (1 ￿ ￿i)hjk] + ￿i￿ijk (5.1)
= ￿i!jk + ￿ihjk + ￿i￿ijk .
The retail margin is the ￿rst termin square braces; it is a weighted average of the productivity-
adjusted wage and the rental price di⁄erential faced by retailers in the two cities. The weights
attached to the relative input prices in the retail sector depend on ￿i. The entire retail com-
ponent gets weighted by its overall share in the production of the ￿nal good, (1 ￿ ￿i). The
18second term is the relative trade cost. The last line, used to specify our regression approach,
expresses the relationship in terms of the three key cost ratios, retail wages, rental prices
and trade costs.
5.1. Regression speci￿cation
This section conducts a variance decomposition of retail prices into the channels described
by the equilibrium model. Adding a measurement error term to the theoretical equation for
the LOP deviation, gives:
qijk = ￿i!jk + ￿ihjk + ￿i￿ijk + "ijk (5.2)
Data on retail prices, wages and rent, are available, but no data on retail productivity or
trade costs exist for this cross-section of locations, at this level of disaggregation. The raw
wage ratios are used in place of !jk and a two-stage estimation approach is used to infer the
impact of trade costs.
The ￿rst-stage regression is:
qijk = ￿1i!jk + ￿1ihjk + ￿ijk. (5.3)
where ￿ijk is an estimated residual, which, according to the theory, is the LOP deviation in
the traded component of cost. In practice it will incorporate other sources of deviations
as well. In an attempt to purge these other factors from the pure trade cost component,






1 if ￿ijk > 0
￿1 if ￿ijk < 0
(5.4)
where ￿ijk = qijk￿￿1i!jk￿￿1ihjk from the ￿rst-stage regression. In words: imports (exports)
are assumed to be relatively expensive (inexpensive) at the destination (source).
19Consider, now, the more elaborate equation for stage two:
qijk = ￿2i!jk + ￿2ihjk + &i2Iijkdjk + "ijk (5.5)
￿2i = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i (5.6)
￿2i = (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i) (5.7)
&2i = ￿i￿i (5.8)
with the trade cost replaced by Iijk￿idjk. The indicator function ensures the sign of the
implied trade cost is consistent with the sign of the residual estimated in stage one. The
greatest circle distance between locations j and k is the empirical counterpart to djk and
goods are allowed to have di⁄erent trade cost elasticities with respect to distance, ￿i. The
bene￿t of projecting the prices on wages, rents, and the indicator function multiplying dis-
tance is that we relegate any sources of variation in retail prices not correlated with wages,
rental prices or distance to the error term. This gives us more con￿dence that the wage,
rental, and trade cost components are capturing what the model says they should.
The model is best suited to describe the long-run properties of real exchange rates since
we abstract from nominal exchange rate variation and sticky prices. While we have a long
panel of EIU retail price data from which to construct time-averages and target long-run price
dispersion, as noted earlier, we lack comparable city-level panel data on wages. Moreover,
the argument could be made for estimating the parameters with a single cross-section. Our
benchmark estimation and variance decomposition uses time-average data as available (i.e.,
for qijk and hjk) and wage data for a single cross-section in 2006. Wage data from the UBS
is used for cities outside of the U.S. and wage data from the BLS is used for U.S. cities.
Preliminary experimentation with alternatives does not seem to alter the main thrust of the
results.
We see in Table 4, that the empirical model captures the majority of long-run retail price
dispersion across locations for all groupings of the data. The range of variance accounted
for is between 70 percent and 90 percent for the median good when pooling all international
cities or just those in North America. The ￿t of the model is excellent over much of the
distribution of goods. The lowest quartile for the R2 is a very respectable 0.67 (the OECD
cross-border pairs). In summary, the empirical model ￿ts well across sub-set of locations
20and across goods ranging from haircuts to personal computers.
5.2. Variance Decomposition
Using the estimated equations motivated by the theory, we are able to provide a cross-
sectional variance decomposition analysis according to the following equation (we suppress
the residual and covariance terms here for expositional convenience; also the parameters
used in computations will be those from the second stage estimation, though we suppress
the subscript denoting this as well in what follows):




According to the theory, geographic price dispersion at the level of an individual good,
i, is a weighted average of the geographic dispersion in distribution costs, Dijk, and the
geographic dispersion of destination prices for traded inputs, dijk. The relative contribution
of distribution costs and trade costs for a particular good hinges on the value taken by the
distribution share, ￿i, ranging from close to zero for a personal computer to close to 1 for a
haircut.
Recall that the distribution cost component is a weighted average of the dispersion in
wages and rental prices:
Dijk ￿ [￿
2
ivarjk(!jk) + (1 ￿ ￿i)
2varjk(hjk)] .
Finally, the quantitative role of trade costs depends on the relationship between trade costs




Table 5 presents estimates of the variances of retail prices, wages and rental prices for
various location groups: i) intranational city pairs (which given the data, is dominated by
U.S. city pairs), and ii) cross-border city pairs (using three groupings, OECD, LDC and
World).
The conventional wisdom is that factor markets are close to perfectly integrated intra-
nationally, while the immobility of labor and possibly capital prevents this from occurring
21internationally. This seems to be a reasonable assumption of labor markets since we ￿nd
wage dispersion of 3 or 4 percent, for intranational pairs. It appears not to be true of rental
prices, where dispersion is about 30 percent. These numbers are fairly robust of inclusion of
intranational city pairs outside of North America.
Turning to cross-border city pairs, consistent with expectations, we see less of a tendency
toward factor-price equalization than within countries. In fact, there is an approximate
tripling of the variance of wages as a consequence of crossing the U.S.-Canadian border.
The border width appears less dramatic when we look at rental prices, where the variance
merely doubles. When we expand the set of international comparisons to the OECD, we ￿nd
virtually no impact on wage dispersion beyond what the U.S.-Canadian border implies, but a
large impact on rental price dispersion. Expanding the geography further to include both the
OECD and non-OECD (the row labelled WORLD), wage dispersion increases considerably
more than rental price dispersion. The main implication for retail price dispersion, though,
is that factor price dispersion rises by a factor of about 30 for both wages and rental prices
as we move from intranational city pairs to a broad cross-section of international city pairs.
Distribution costs, therefore, are expected to be signi￿cant contributors to the absolute
level of LOP deviations at the retail level, particularly for cross-border pairs since factor
prices are far from being equalized internationally. Moreover, the relative contribution of
distribution costs relative to trade costs will shift across goods according to the distribution
share parameter, ￿i.
We turn now to the details of the variance decomposition. The analysis considers both
a variance decomposition for the median good and results good-by-good. In each case we
contrast interesting geographic groups. For the discussion that follows, it is useful to refer
to the full variance decomposition:
varjk (qijk) = [(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i]
2varjk(!jk) + [(1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i)]
2varjk(hjk) + (￿i￿i)
2varjk [Iijkdjk]
+varjk ["ijk] + cov terms
Consider a good which uses no traded inputs at the retail level (￿i = 0). The prediction
simpli￿es reduces to:
varjk (qijk) = ￿
2
ivarjk(!jk) + (1 ￿ ￿i)
2varjk(hjk) + cov terms
22We key insight here, is that price dispersion is entirely due to retail costs associated with
wage and rental price dispersion, varjk(!jk) and varjk(hjk), respectively. These numbers
naturally depend on the locations pooled in the estimation for the reasons discussed earlier.
Borders matter.
At the opposite end of the continuum is a good with no retail costs at all (e.g., a good
available on the internet that trades up to a shipping cost everywhere in the world (￿i = 1)).
Now the expression for the predicted price dispersion reduces to:
varjk (qijk) = ￿
2
ivarjk [Iijkdjk]
This is an intriguing expression. The coe¢ cient out front is the elasticity of trade cost with
respect to distance (recall, the empirical model assumes a log-linear proportional trade cost
function as is typical in the gravity literature). The variance of distance is a function of the
set of locations under examination. As bilateral distance become less symmetric (less equal),
trade cost matters more for price deviations.
The variance decomposition results are given in Table 6. For the median good, distrib-
ution costs account for between 5 and 20 percent of overall price dispersion, depending on
the locations used. The wage component tends to account for more of this dispersion than
the rental component. An exception is the LDC group where the rental component accounts
for 12.6 percent of the dispersion, compared to only 2.5 percent for wages. Trade costs
dominate the picture throughout the table, accounting for as much as 60 percent of the price
dispersion for cross-border OECD pairs, to a lower, but still very substantial, 36.1 percent
across the Canada-U.S. border.
Variation across goods within the cross-section, is interesting. Figure 2 shows the variance
decomposition at the individual good level as a function of the traded input share, ￿i. To
make these easier to read we have smoothed the pro￿les by taking centered moving averages
of the variance share across 10 goods. Starting with all international cross-border pairs and
the good with the lowest traded input share (roughly 0.4), wage dispersion accounts for
about 45 percent of price dispersion. As we move to goods with the highest traded input
share (roughly 0.97), wage dispersion accounts for almost none of the price dispersion. Of
course if this good had literally no non-traded inputs the contribution would necessarily
23be exactly zero. The OECD group tells a similar story with about 30 percent of price
dispersion accounted for by wage dispersion at one end of the continuum of goods and less
than 10 percent contributed for goods embodying mostly traded inputs. The Canada-U.S.
pairs have a lower contribution from wage dispersion as we would expect given the similar
wage levels of the two countries, the contribution of this component also declines as ￿ rises,
though not as smoothly as the other groups. In most cases, the falling contribution of wage
di⁄erences is associated with a rising role for trade costs. The intranational pairs show less
heterogeneity in the proportion of variance explained by various components as the trade
share of ￿nal good production varies. Partly this re￿ ects the lower variance of wages and
rent across cities within countries. Nonetheless, the contribution of distribution costs is not
negligible for the intranational pairs either.
Figure 3 displays the same variance decomposition by good plotted against the labor
share of total retail cost, ￿i. We see the dramatic e⁄ect of this parameter on the split of
distribution margin variance across labor and rent. As we move across goods based on this
parameter, the contribution of rent goes from zero to about 40 percent in the Canada-U.S.
panel and from zero to about 20 percent in the world grouping (for cross-border city pairs).
The contribution of wage dispersion tends to follow the same pattern in reverse, maintaining
the total share of price dispersion due to distribution costs. The OECD is anomalous in the
sense that the distribution share contributes about 10 percent without much variation across
goods until we reach very high labor intensities in distribution. Turning to the intranational
pairs, the overall contribution of wage dispersion is rising in its cost share as one would
expect.
The results for the median good in the EIU cross-section seem to downplay the role of
distribution costs relative to trade costs. Given the dramatic di⁄erences in the distribution
share across goods, a natural question that arises is how representative the EIU sample is of
the CPI basket. We check this by comparing the average estimated value of the distribution
share across goods in the EIU with the average value implied by the U.S. NIPA shares. To
accomplish this, each good in the EIU panel is placed into a sector found in the U.S. NIPA.
The average estimated distribution share is 0.2, signi￿cantly below, 0.5, the average value
across goods based on sectoral U.S. NIPA shares for the matched sample.
24To account for this estimation bias and make the results relevant for aggregate consump-
tion, we recompute our variance decomposition using goods with distribution shares in the
neighborhood of ￿ = 0:5, the expenditure weighted average of the distribution shares found
in the U.S. NIPA data. What we do is average the decomposition results across 5 goods
on either side of this value. Table 7 reports these ￿ndings. We see that the contribution
of the distribution margin is much more signi￿cant. Wage dispersion alone now accounts
for more than one-third of retail price dispersion when all cross-border city pairs are pooled
(WORLD). The role of wages for the OECD and LDC groupings is more limited suggest-
ing the city pairs that straddle high and low income countries are the reason for the much
elevated wage component. It is interesting to note that for the Canada-U.S. pairs, wage dis-
persion plays a signi￿cant role as well. Keep in mind, however, that the absolute dispersion
of prices across North American cities is about one-￿fth of that existing across cities of the
world, thus the signi￿cant role of wage dispersion in North America is partly due to the fact
that there is little in the way of price dispersion to explain in North America relative to the
broader international sample.
6. Conclusions
Consumers face prices that are to a varying degree, location-speci￿c. Our model of produc-
tion and distribution across cities shows how these di⁄erences are shaped by the distances
separating cities due to trade costs, the good-speci￿c share of retail distribution and its
division of these costs between labor and land. While we found trade costs dominated
distribution costs by a factor of 5 to 1 for the median good in the sample, their relative
contribution varies greatly across goods. For ￿nal goods that involve mostly non-traded
inputs, distribution margins dominate trade costs. Given that most of the goods in the EIU
have low distribution shares, these unweighted averages signi￿cantly understate the role of
distribution margins in the aggregate consumption basket. Using the aggregate distribution
share and estimates of the variance decomposition for individual goods with that share, the
tables are turn: distribution costs now dominate trade costs.
Our results are subject to an important caveat, which is pervasive throughout the existing
25literature. The theory attributes a signi￿cant role to local rental prices and wage rates in
determining retail distribution costs and this is supported by our empirical ￿ndings. We
have employed measures of service sector wages per hour and land prices per square foot,
down to the level of cities. The theory requires these factor costs to be evaluted per unit sold
for each good, at the retail level. To acheive this would require adjustments of raw factor
input prices to account for labor productivity variation and infrastructure utilization rates,
which are simply not currently available. The downward bias of our regression estimates
of good-by-good distribution shares may re￿ ect this measurement error and while this bias
may actually help to improve our estimates of how factor price dispersion translates into
retail price dispersion relative to a pure calibration exercise, more direct evidence would be
reassuring.8 Until these empirical hurdles are fully met, the literature will have di¢ culty
con￿dently ascribing geographic retail price dispersion to the real costs of distribution versus
other competing theories. Much remains to be done.
7. References
Alessandria, George. 2004. ￿International Deviations From the Law-of-One-Price: The
Role of Search Frictions and Market Share.￿International Economic Review 45(4): 1263-
1291.
Alessandria, George and Joseph Kaboski. 2007.￿Pricing-to-Market and the Failure
of Absolute PPP.￿Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 01-17.
Alvarez, Fernando and Robert E. Lucas. 2007. ￿General Equilibrium of the Eaton-
Kortum Model of International Trade.￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(6): 1726-1768.
Atkeson, Andrew and Burstein, Ariel. 2007. ￿Pricing-to-Market in a Ricardian
Model of International Trade,￿American Economic Review, 97(2): 362-367.
Burstein, Ariel, Joao Neves and Sergio Rebelo. 2003. ￿Distribution Costs and
Real Exchange Rate Dynamics During Exchange-Rate Based Stabilizations,￿ Journal of
8The di⁄erences between the regression estimates of the distribution share and the direct NIPA measure is
not due to a few outliers: 151 out of 160 regression coe¢ cients values are below their NIPA counterparts. The
least squares estimates and the NIPA measures of the distribution shares, are, however, strongly positively
correlated in the cross-section.
26Monetary Economics, 50(6): 1189-1214.
Burstein, Ariel, Martin Eichenbaum and Sergio Rebelo. 2005. ￿Large Devalua-
tions and the Real Exchange Rate,￿Journal of Political Economy, 113(4): 742-784.
Burstein, Ariel, Martin Eichenbaum and Sergio Rebelo. 2007. ￿Modeling Ex-
change Rate Passthrough After Large Devaluations.￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 54(2):
346-368.
Choi, Yo Chul, David Hummels and Chong Qiang. 2009. ￿Explaining Import
Quality: The Role of Income Distribution.￿Journal of International Economics, 77(2): 265-
275.
Crucini, Mario J., Chris I. Telmer and Marios Zachariadis. 2005. ￿Understand-
ing European Real Exchange Rates.￿American Economic Review, 95(3): 724-38.
Crucini, Mario J. and Motostugu Shintani. 2008. ￿Persistence in Deviations from
the Law-of-One-Price: Evidence from Micro-Data.￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 55(3):
629-644.
Crucini, Mario J. and Telmer, Chris I. 2007. ￿Microeconomic Sources of Real
Exchange Rate Variation.￿Unpublished manuscript.
Eaton, Jonathan and Samuel Kortum. 2002. ￿Technology, Geography and Trade.￿
Econometrica, 70(5):1741-1779.
Giri, Raul. 2009. ￿Local Costs of Distribution, International Trade Costs and Micro
Evidence on the Law of One Price.￿ Unpublished manuscript.
Hummels, David. 2001. ￿Toward a Geography of Trade Costs.￿Unpublished manu-
script.
King, Robert K., Charles I. Plosser and Sergio Rebelo. 1988. ￿Production,
Growth and Business Cycles: I. The Basic Neoclassical Model.￿Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 21(2-3): 195-232.
Long, John and Charles I. Plosser. 1983. ￿Real Business Cycles.￿Journal of Polit-
ical Economy, 91: 39-69.
Naknoi, K. 2008. ￿Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Endogenous Tradability and
Exchange Rate Regimes.￿Journal of Monetary Economics, 55: 645-663.
Oostendorp, Remco H. (2003), ￿The Standardized ILO October Inquiry 1983-2003,￿
27Free University Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam Institute for International de-
velopment. Unpublished.
28Table 1. Kernel Density Summary Results
Long-run LOP deviations
Standard Interquartile First Third
Deviation Range Quartile Quartile
U.S. cities
Traded goods 0.294 0.385 -0.161 0.224
Non-traded goods 0.543 0.616 -0.250 0.366
International cities
Traded goods 0.681 0.796 -0.365 0.431
Non-traded goods 1.069 1.092 -0.497 0.595
Short-run LOP deviations
Standard Interquartile First Third
Deviation Range Quartile Quartile
U.S. cities
Traded goods 0.250 0.295 -0.151 0.144
Non-traded goods 0.258 0.295 -0.151 0.144
International cities
Traded goods 0.412 0.417 -0.209 0.209
Non-traded goods 0.488 0.430 -0.215 0.215
Note: Long-run LOP deviations are time-averaged LOP deviations, short-run LOP de-
viations are the di⁄erence between the raw LOP series and the long-run means.




World Manufacture to Sales (ILO) 1.07 0.52
U.S. Production to Sales (BLS) 1.34 0.57
Note: For details on the data sources, see the data section.
30Table 3. Variance of wage di⁄erentials across sectors and locations
Industry (ILO) Occupation (ILO)
Location Sector Error Location Sector Error
World
Proportion of variance 0.85 0.04 0.10 0.65 0.01 0.34
Observations 46 19 136 113
OECD
Proportion of variance 0.84 0.06 0.10 0.64 0.03 0.33
Observations 27 12 26 113
LDC
Proportion of variance 0.72 0.08 0.20 0.38 0.04 0.58
Observations 36 19 109 113
Occupation (UBS)
World
Proportion of variance 0.66 0.19 0.15
Observations 56 14
OECD
Proportion of variance 0.51 0.31 0.18
Observations 32 14
LDC
Proportion of variance 0.48 0.29 0.23
Observations 24 14
Notes: A panel has been selected such that the total number of
observations is maximized.
31Table 4. Explanatory power
First quartile Median Third quartile
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0.83 0.90 0.94
OECD 0.67 0.71 0.74
LDC 0.70 0.73 0.75
WORLD 0.69 0.72 0.75
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0.72 0.77 0.81
OECD 0.71 0.76 0.79
WORLD 0.70 0.75 0.79
LDC 0.70 0.73 0.75
32Table 5. Variance of prices across locations
Retail Rental
Prices Wages Prices
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0.07 0.13 0.61
OECD 0.25 0.17 3.05
LDC 0.42 0.59 11.18
WORLD 0.38 1.15 9.49
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0.06 0.04 0.33
OECD 0.06 0.03 0.27
LDC ￿ ￿ ￿
WORLD 0.07 0.03 0.28
33Table 6. Variance Decomposition (median across goods, ￿ = 0:8)
Total Fraction of variance account for by:
Wages Rental Prices Trade cost Error Covariance
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0.07 10.1 7.8 36.1 12.8 15.5
OECD 0.25 2.3 1.7 60.0 29.4 0.8
LDC 0.42 2.5 12.6 53.9 27.2 0.4
WORLD 0.38 7.7 3.4 50.7 28.1 5.1
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0.06 4.8 5.9 53.8 24.8 2.3
OECD 0.06 5.1 3.7 51.4 26.5 3.0
LDC ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
WORLD 0.07 5.2 4.9 55.8 26.1 1.7
34Table 7. Variance Decomposition (aggregate ￿ = 0:5)
Total Fraction of variance account for by:
Wages Rental Prices Trade cost Error
Panel A: International cities, cross-border pairs
CANADA-US 0.10 31.8 16.6 38.5 13.1
OECD 0.36 10.7 6.2 54.6 28.5
LDC 0.75 15.2 16.7 45.7 22.4
WORLD 0.66 36.4 6.8 36.0 20.9
Panel B: Intranational cities, no border
CANADA-US 0.12 10.0 8.5 57.2 24.3
OECD 0.13 6.6 11.0 56.0 26.3
LDC
WORLD 0.10 8.6 6.3 59.7 25.4
35Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of price distributions.
Note: The solid lines are kernel density estimates of the distribution of qijk, time averaged
LOP deviations over the period 1990-2005. The dashed lines are kernel density estimates
of the distribution of (qijk;t ￿ qijk), time series deviations from these long-run values. Each
chart contains a di⁄erent location and commodity grouping as indicated by the headers.
36Figure 2. Variance decomposition of price dispersion as a function of ￿i the share of traded input
costs (x-axis)
37Figure 3. Variance decomposition of price dispersion as a function of ￿i the labor share of
non-traded input costs (x-axis)
388. Model Appendix
This appendix presents the function forms of the model, the ￿rst-order conditions and details
for the model solution.
8.1. Function forms






















































j + (1 ￿ ’)HjKj
where ’ 2 (0;1) is the capital income share received by the manufacturer, (1 ￿ ’) is the
capital income share received by the retailer, Hj is the price of capital, and Kj is the amount
of capital.
398.3. Consumer and producer problems
max
Cj
f(1 ￿ ￿)log(Cj) + ￿logLj + ￿j[W
m
j (1 ￿ Lj) + ’HjKj ￿ PjCj]g (8.6)
max
Cj
f(1 ￿ ￿)log(Cj) + ￿logLj + ￿j[W
s
























ij ￿ HjKijg (8.9)








































































































































Qji = (1 + ￿ji)Qjj (8.22)
408.6. The retail ￿rm
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8.7.1. Manufacturing Labor Market
The labor supply of the manufacturer is used in the manufacturing process, which implies:
Yj
Aj






In the global general equilibrium all the conditions of partial equilibrium must hold. However
we also require that the supply of each good equals the demand for each good. This is where
the treatment of trade costs becomes crucial. We will assume that trade costs are of the




Gji (1 + ￿ij) (8.24)
In words: the units produced equal the demand of traded inputs of retailers at the des-
tinations plus a fraction lost to iceberg costs. The loss along any bilateral trade route is






i Gji (1 + ￿ij)
(8.25)


















































(1 + ￿ji) (8.26)
= Aj
￿































































In words: total income/retail sales of good i is equal to the share of that good in the budget
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= Aj
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i + HiKi)￿j (1 + ￿ji) = Aj
￿





By using Qjj =
Wm
j














i + HiKi)￿j (1 + ￿ji) =
￿









































This is the ￿rst equation for the relation between NmW m, NsW s, and HK.
8.7.3. Retailing Labor Market
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(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i￿i (8.29)
This is the second equation for the relation between NmW m, NsW s, and HK.
438.7.4. Capital Market












































(1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i (8.30)
This is the third equation for the relation between NmW m, NsW s, and HK.
8.7.5. Implications for Wages, Rents, Wage Income, and Capital Income
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P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i)
(8.33)
which show that the sectoral wage incomes and capital incomes are all proportional to each
other within each city.
Recall the individual optimality condition for the retailer:
N
s
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(
P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i￿i) + (1 ￿ ’)￿(
P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i)
(8.34)
which shows that Ns
j is constant across regions. In a special case in which the share of
capital is equal to zero in the retail production function (i.e., ￿i = 0), or in which the share
of capital income received by the retailer is equal to zero (i.e., ’ = 1), we have Ns
j = (1 ￿ ￿).
































which show that the manufacturing wage income and the retailing wage income are propor-

















where KA is the capital stock in city A = j;k.
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j = (1 ￿ ￿) ￿
’￿(￿0 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿)
’￿(￿0 ￿ ￿1) + (1 ￿ ￿0)
= (1 ￿ ￿) when ’ = 0 or ￿i = 1
where ￿0 ￿
P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i, ￿1 ￿
P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i￿i, ￿0 ￿ ￿1 =
P
i (1 ￿ ￿i)(1 ￿ ￿i)￿i.￿2 ￿
P
i ￿i￿i = 1￿￿0. This shows that Nm
j is constant and equal across cities. The level of e⁄ort
is equals, (1 ￿ ￿) when either rental income is zero for the manufacturer (’ = 0) or when
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468.8. Implications for Price Ratios across Cities
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By using Qij = (1 + ￿ij)Qii, we can write the ratio of the price of good i across regions j






































where Kj is the total amount of capital in city j.
9. Estimation Appendix
The derivation of the variance decomposition of equation 5.5 can be written as follows:







+ varjk [Et (b "ijk;t)]
+2cov ((1 ￿ b ￿i)b ￿iEt (!jk;t);(1 ￿ b ￿i)(1 ￿ b ￿i)Et (hjk;t))
+2cov
￿










where b ￿i￿ s, b ￿i￿ s, b Iijk￿ s, b ￿i￿ s and b "ijk￿ s are all estimated values for the relevant variables. Note
that the covariance terms including Et (b "ijk;t) are equal to zero by OLS regression.
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